

First order Mean Field Games on networks

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First order Mean Field Games: Euclidean setting

The Mean Field Games model was proposed by [Lasry-Lions](#) in 2006 for describing interactions among a **very large** (“infinite”) number of, **indistinguishable and individually negligible**, agents when individual actions are related to mass behaviour and vice versa.

Model example: \mathbb{R}^d

The generic player, starting at point $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ at time t , chooses the best trajectory γ so to minimize the cost

$$\int_t^T \left[\frac{|\gamma'(s)|^2}{2} + \ell[m(s)](\gamma(s), s) \right] ds + G[m(T)](\gamma(T)),$$

where $m(s)$ is the distribution of the population at time s .

MFG system

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{(HJ)} & -u_t + \frac{1}{2}|\nabla u|^2 - \ell[m(t)](x, t) = 0 & (x, t) \in (0, T) \times \mathbb{R}^d \\ \text{(C)} & m_t - \operatorname{div}(m\nabla u) = 0 & (x, t) \in (0, T) \times \mathbb{R}^d \\ & u(T, x) = G[m(T)](x) & x \in \mathbb{R}^d \\ & m(0, x) = m_0(x) & x \in \mathbb{R}^d \end{array} \right.$$

where m_0 is the initial distribution of agents: $m_0 \geq 0$, $\int_{\mathbb{R}^d} m_0 dx = 1$.

- The first equation is a **Hamilton-Jacobi** equation for the value function u for a generic player.
- The second equation is a **continuity** equation for the density m of the population.

Theorem [PL Lions] (see also Cardaliaguet)


There exist $u \in W_{\text{loc}}^{1, \infty}([0, T] \times \mathbb{R}^d)$ and $m \in C([0, T]; \mathcal{P}_1(\mathbb{R}^d))$, bounded, such that

-) u solves (HJ) in the viscosity sense
-) m solves (C) in the sense of distributions.

AIM

Our aim is to study some classes of first order MFG when the dynamics of the agents take place in a network \mathcal{G} .

A network is a connected set \mathcal{G} formed by a set of vertices $V := \{v_i\}_{i \in I_V}$ and a set of edges $E := \{J_i\}_{i \in I_E}$ connecting the vertices. We assume that \mathcal{G} is embedded in \mathbb{R}^d and that any two edges can intersect only at a vertex.



(a) An example of network


Literature for 1st order MFG

- MFG on Euclidean spaces
 - ▶ *classical approach*
 - ★ P.L. Lions' lectures at Collège de France 2012 - Cardaliaguet "Notes on Mean Field Games"
 - ★ Cardaliaguet, DGA 2013
 - ▶ *Lagrangian approach for state constraints*
 - ★ Benamou-Carlier, JOTA 2015
 - ★ Cannarsa-Capuani, Springer-Indam, 2018
 - ★ Cannarsa-Capuani-Cardaliaguet, ME 2019 & CVPDE 2021
 - ★ Mazanti-Santambrogio, M³AS 2019
- MFG on graphs (finite number of states)
 - ▶ Gomes-Mohr-Souza, JMPA 2010 & AMO 2013
- MFG on networks (2nd order case)
 - ▶ Camilli-Marchi, SIAM JCO 2016
 - ▶ Achdou-Dao-Ley-Tchou, NHM 2019 & CVPDE 2020
- MFG on networks (1st order MFG and Wardrop equilibrium)
 - ▶ Gomes *et al.* preprint

Control on the velocity – star shaped network

Star shaped network

For simplicity, consider a network \mathcal{G} with N semi-infinite straight edges $(J_i)_{i=1,\dots,N}$ glued at the origin O . The edge J_i is the closed half-line $\mathbb{R}^+ e_i$. The vectors e_i are two by two distinct unit vectors.



$$T_O(\mathcal{G}) = \cup_{j=1}^7 \mathbb{R}^+ e_j$$

Cost for a generic player

The state space is \mathcal{G} . The generic player aims at minimizing the cost

$$J(x, t, \gamma') = \int_t^T \left[\frac{|\gamma'(s)|^2}{2} + \ell[m(s)](\gamma(s), s) \right] ds + G[m(T)](\gamma(T))$$

where

$$\ell[m](x, s) = \sum_{i=1}^N \ell_i[m](x, s) \mathbf{1}_{x \in J_i \setminus \{O\}} + \ell_O[m](s) \mathbf{1}_{x=O}$$
$$G[m](x) = \sum_{i=1}^N G_i[m](x) \mathbf{1}_{x \in J_i \setminus \{O\}} + G_O[m] \mathbf{1}_{x=O}$$


and

$$\ell_O[m](s) = \min\{\ell_*[m](s), \min_{i=1, \dots, N} \ell_i[m](O, s)\}$$
$$G_O[m] = \min\{G_*[m], \min_{i=1, \dots, N} G_i[m](O)\}.$$

Main issues

- The running cost ℓ and the final cost G may be not continuous in O .
- The distribution of players may develop a singularity for any $t > 0$. This singularity may move in the network.

Example. Consider $\mathcal{G} = J_1 \cup J_2$, $m_0 = 1$ on $[0, 1]J_2$, $G = 0$ and ℓ is



(c) A development of singularity

Consequence

We follow a Lagrangian approach.

Notations.

- $\Gamma = \{\gamma \in W^{1,2}(0, T; \mathbb{R}^d) : \gamma(\cdot) \in \mathcal{G}\}$, $\Gamma[x] = \{\gamma \in \Gamma : \gamma(0) = x\}$
- $\mathcal{P}(\Gamma) = \{\text{Borel probability measures on } \Gamma\}$
- $\forall t \in [0, T]$, the **evaluation map** is $e_t : \Gamma \rightarrow \mathcal{G}$ with $e_t(\gamma) = \gamma(t)$
- $\mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma) = \{\eta \in \mathcal{P}(\Gamma) : e_0 \# \eta = m_0\}$
- to each $\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$, we associate the cost

$$J^\eta(t, x, \gamma') = \int_t^T \left[\frac{|\gamma'(s)|^2}{2} + \ell[e_s \# \eta](\gamma(s), s) \right] ds + G[e_T \# \eta](\gamma(T))$$

and the corresponding set of **optimal trajectories**

$$\Gamma^\eta[x] = \{\gamma \in \Gamma[x] : J^\eta(0, x, \gamma') \leq J^\eta(0, x, \tilde{\gamma}') \quad \forall \tilde{\gamma} \in \Gamma[x]\}.$$

Lemma (Existence of optimal trajectories)

For any $\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$ and $x \in \mathcal{G}$, \exists an optimal trajectory starting at x .

Lemma (Approximation of admissible trajectories)

Let $x_n \rightarrow x$ and $\gamma \in \Gamma[x]$. Then, $\exists \gamma_n \in \Gamma[x_n]$ such that

$$\gamma_n \rightarrow \gamma \text{ unif.}, \quad \gamma'_n \rightarrow \gamma' \text{ in } L^2, \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} J^\eta(0, x_n, \gamma'_n) = J^\eta(0, x, \gamma').$$

Definition

A measure $\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$ is a **MFG equilibrium** for m_0 if

$$\text{supp}(\eta) \subset \bigcup_{x \in \text{supp}(m_0)} \Gamma^\eta[x].$$

(Recall: $\Gamma^\eta[x] = \{\gamma \in \Gamma[x] : J^\eta(0, x, \gamma') \leq J^\eta(0, x, \tilde{\gamma}') \quad \forall \tilde{\gamma}' \in \Gamma[x]\}$.)

Theorem 1 (Existence of a MFG equilibrium)

Assume

- $m_0 \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G})$ has compact support
- $\ell_i[\cdot] : \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow C^0(\mathcal{G} \times [0, T])$ are bounded and continuous
- $G_i[\cdot] : \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G}) \rightarrow C^0(\mathcal{G})$ are bounded and continuous

for $i = *, 1, \dots, N$.

Then, there exists a MFG equilibrium η associated with m_0 .

Proof (sketch)

Following the *Lagrangian approach* of [Cannarsa-Capuani](#), we introduce the *multivalued* map: for a suitable compact subset \mathcal{K} of $\mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$,

$$E : \mathcal{K} \rightrightarrows \mathcal{K}$$

$$E(\eta) = \left\{ \hat{\eta} \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma) : \text{supp}(\hat{\eta}) \subset \bigcup_{x \in \text{supp}(m_0)} \Gamma^\eta[x] \right\}$$

and we apply [Kakutani](#) fixed point Theorem to obtain a MFG equilibrium. To this end, we have to prove

- $\forall \eta \in \mathcal{K}$, $E(\eta)$ is a nonempty set
- $\forall \eta \in \mathcal{K}$, $E(\eta)$ is a convex subset of \mathcal{K}
- the map E fulfills the closed graph property.

For C sufficiently large, we consider the compact set

$$\mathcal{K} = \{\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma) : \text{supp}(\eta) \subset \{\gamma : \|\gamma'\|_2 \leq C, \|\text{dist}(\gamma(\cdot), O)\|_\infty \leq C\}\}.$$

Step 1. $\forall \eta \in \mathcal{K}$, $E(\eta)$ is a **nonempty convex** set.

Step 2. E fulfills the **closed graph property**:

if $\eta^n \in \mathcal{K}$ with $\eta^n \rightarrow \eta$ and $\hat{\eta}^n \in E(\eta^n)$ with $\hat{\eta}^n \rightarrow \hat{\eta}$, then $\hat{\eta} \in E(\eta)$.

- **Disintegration theorem** for $\hat{\eta}$:

$$\int_{\Gamma} f(\gamma) \hat{\eta}(d\gamma) = \int_{\mathcal{G}} \left(\int_{\Gamma[x]} f(\gamma) \hat{\eta}_x(d\gamma) \right) m_0(dx).$$

- **Kuratowski convergence theorem**: $\forall \gamma \in \text{supp} \hat{\eta}_x, \exists \{\gamma_n\}_n$ with $\gamma_n \in \text{supp} \hat{\eta}^n$ and $\gamma_n \rightarrow \gamma$ unif.. Hence:
 $\gamma_n \in \Gamma^{\eta^n}[\gamma_n(0)]$ and $\gamma_n(0) \rightarrow \gamma(0) = x$.
- **The multivalued map $(x, \eta) \mapsto \Gamma^\eta[x]$ has the closed graph property**:
 $\gamma \in \Gamma^\eta[x]$.

Theorem 2 (Lipschitz continuity of optimal trajectories)

Assume $\ell_i[m](\cdot, t), G_i[m](\cdot) \in C^2(J_i)$ with

$$\|\ell_i[m](\cdot, t)\|_{C^2(J_i)}, \|G_i[m](\cdot)\|_{C^2(J_i)} \leq K \quad \forall t \in [0, T], m \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G}).$$

Then, for any MFG equilibrium η , there holds

$$\|\gamma'\|_\infty \leq V \quad \forall \gamma \in \Gamma^\eta[x]$$

where V is a constant depending only on \mathcal{G} , K and $|x - O|$.

Proof (sketch)

Consider $\gamma \in \Gamma^\eta[x]$.

- **Case 1. γ is inside an edge: Euler-Lagrange condition.** If $\gamma \in J_i \setminus \{O\}$ in (t_1, t_2) , then $\gamma''(t) = \partial_x \ell_i[e_t \# \eta](\gamma(t), t)$ in (t_1, t_2) .
- **Case 2. γ ends inside an edge: transversality condition.** If $\gamma(T) \in J_i \setminus \{O\}$, then $\gamma'(T) = -\partial_x G_i[e_T \# \eta](\gamma(T))$.
- **Case 3. γ occupies twice O .** If $\gamma(t_1) = \gamma(t_2) = O$ with $t_1 \neq t_2$, and $\gamma(t) \in J_i \setminus \{O\}$ for $t \in (t_1, t_2)$ then $\exists t_* \in (t_1, t_2)$ s.t. $\gamma'(t_*) = 0$.
- **Case 4. γ starts inside an edge.** If $x \in J_i \setminus \{O\}$, then $|\gamma'(0)| \leq C$ for a constant C depending only on $|x - O|$.

Definition

A couple (u, m) is a **mild solution** to the MFG if there exists a MFG equilibrium $\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$ such that

- $m(t) = e_t \# \eta \quad \forall t \in [0, T]$
- u is the value function associated to η :

$$u(t, x) = \inf_{\gamma \text{ adm.}} J^m(t, x, \gamma').$$

Corollary (Existence and regularity of a mild solution)

Under the assumptions of Theorem 1

- (i) There exists a mild solution (u, m) to the MFG.

Moreover, under the assumptions of Theorem 2

- (ii) m belongs to $Lip(0, T; \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{G}))$
- (iii) u is locally Lipschitz continuous in $\mathcal{G} \times (0, T)$.

Proof (sketch)

- (i) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
- (ii) is obtained following the same arguments of Theorem 1 and taking advantage of Theorem 2.
- (iii)
 - (a) Lipschitz continuity in space (using competitor)
 - (b) local Lipschitz continuity in time (using (a) and Theorem 2).

Hamilton-Jacobi problem on the network

Question

Does u solve a **Hamilton-Jacobi** problem defined on \mathcal{G} ?

Hamilton-Jacobi on networks: [Achdou-Camilli-Cutrì-Tchou'13], [Imbert-Monneau-Zidani'13], [Camilli-Schieborn'13], [Imbert-Monneau'17], [Barles-Briani-Chasseigne'14], [Barles-Chasseigne'15], [Achdou-Oudet-Tchou'15], [Lions-Souganidis'16], [Graber-Hermosilla-Zidani'17], [Morfe'20], [Carlini-Festa-Forcadel'20], [Fayad-Forcadel-Ibrahim'22], [Barles-Chasseigne, ppt], [Siconolfi'22]....

Answer

YES.

We first need to introduce the HJ operators.

Notations: test functions and HJ operators

- $C^1(\mathcal{G}) = \{\varphi \in C(\mathcal{G}); \varphi|_{J_i} \in C^1(\mathbb{R}^+ e_i), \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N\}$
- for $\varphi \in C^1(\mathcal{G})$,

$$D\varphi(x) = \begin{cases} D\varphi|_{J_i} & \text{if } x \in J_i \setminus \{O\} \\ (D\varphi|_{J_1}, \dots, D\varphi|_{J_N}) & \text{if } x = O; \end{cases}$$

and analogously for $\varphi \in C^1(\mathcal{G} \times [0, T])$.

- **Hamilton-Jacobi operators.** Fix a MFG equilibrium $\eta \in \mathcal{P}_{m_0}(\Gamma)$.
 $\forall x \in J_i, p \in \mathbb{R}$

$$H_i^\eta(x, t, p) = \frac{|p|^2}{2} - \ell_i[e_t \# \eta](x, t)$$
$$H_{i,+}^\eta(O, t, p) = \begin{cases} \frac{|p|^2}{2} - \ell_i[e_t \# \eta](O, t) & \text{if } p \leq 0 \\ -\ell_i[e_t \# \eta](O, t) & \text{if } p > 0. \end{cases}$$

Hamilton-Jacobi problem associated to η

$$(HJ_\eta) \quad \begin{cases} -\partial_t u + H_i^\eta(x, t, Du) = 0 & \text{if } x \in J_i \setminus \{O\} \\ -\partial_t u + H_O^\eta(t, Du) = 0 & \text{if } x = O \\ u(T, x) = G[e_T \# \eta](x) & \text{on } \mathcal{G} \end{cases}$$

$$H_O^\eta(t, p) = \max \left\{ -\ell_O[e_t \# \eta](t), \max_{i=1, \dots, N} \left\{ H_{i,+}^\eta(O, t, p_i) \right\} \right\}$$

Definition: solutions

u is a subsolution (resp., a supersolution) if: for all $\varphi \in C^1((0, T) \times \mathcal{G})$ s.t. $u - \varphi$ has a maximum (resp., a minimum) at (t, x) there holds

$$\begin{aligned} -\varphi_t(t, x) + H_i^\eta(x, t, D\varphi) &\leq 0 & (\text{resp., } \geq 0) & \text{if } x \in J_i \setminus \{O\} \\ -\varphi_t(t, x) + H_O^\eta(t, D\varphi) &\leq 0 & (\text{resp., } \geq 0) & \text{if } x = O. \end{aligned}$$

Proposition

The value function u is a solution to (HJ_η) .

In a network, the generic player controls its **acceleration $x''(s)$** with or without bounds on x'' .

Main features:

- the state is (x, x')
- lack of local controllability
- viability set.

Thank You!